Introduction
Although A u~tral ia ha~ a Ia rge n u n1 her of unions this does not i n1 p' ly that'~ orkers hHve the right to choose het\\·een unions or to create unions of their O\\ n choosing. At the federal ' le\ el the legislalive fratne\vork is specifically designed to · •ninin1isc duplication of union coverage. l ·he vehicle ,~· hereby this object is achieved is the process of fedcra ' l registration. Registration enlails an attetnpt to vest unions · with rnut.ually ẽxclusive coverage rights \Vilh the boundaries between unions usually being defined in occupational tenns. 1 The principal attractions of registration are threefold. First unions are freed from the necessity to engage in costly and difficult struggles \vith en1ployers for recognition. Having gained recognition. however~ a union cannot compel an en1ployer to negotiate. Second. if negotiations are unsuccess~ul a union can activate the processes of co~11pulsory concilia· tion and arbitration with the outcon1e (award) being legally binding. -1 .. hi:rd. registration in1plies that cn1ployees arc unlikely to be abJe to exercise a choice behveen unions. thereby guaranteeing registered unions a core n1en1bership and an associated revenue flovJ. Th . is rnay be further augn1ented as a result of various union security devices arrived at through arbitral processes or collective negotiations.
The protection afforded to registered unions fron1 con1pctitors and antagonistic eJn players is not only a n1ajor attraction of federal registration: it is a key reason for the continued existence of a large nun1ber of unions (HO\\'ard. 1980 . pp 84-R9) . l-Ienee, in 1979. there \vere 328 unions with the nun1ber fa'lling to 319 in 1983 and rising to 329 in 1984 . At Decen1ber 1984 of these unions were federally registered and th. ey repfesented 82 percent of all union n1ernbers (Australian Bureau ofStatist.ics. 1984) . Significantly. the nun1erical don1inance of fedcr.aHy registered unions has been achieved despite the disinclination or failure of successive industrial registrars to define exclus· ive coverage rights for registered un· ions. Indeed. it ha.., been suggested (Hov.'ard. 1980. pp 86) that the ~arty industrial registrars sonh~li 1nes exercised a di cretion not to grant exclusive rights of.<:overage in order to effect one of the n1ajor objectives of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act ··to encourage the 150 J u'lian ' Teicher organi at ion of representative organi ation · of ernployl:rs and en1ployecs and their registration under the Act ... In part the duplication of coverage rights al ·o reflects Au tralia·. inheritance fron1 Britain of a structure of craft and occupational unions overlaid with a nun1her of ' large conglornenue occupational unions. That is. over tin1c techno1ogical and organisational changes have produced further overlaps :in union coverage rights a~ sorne skills vanish and others arc created. For exan1plc. in the shipbuilding industry the shift fron1 tirnber to n1etal construction produced a longstanding den1arcation dispute bet\\een ship\\'rights and boil~rn1akcrs. ' The nature of the registration process i · also centra ' ! to the suhjcct ofbreaka\vay union . As con1n1only understood a union brcaka\vay i conslitutcd by the secession of a rninority interest group \vhich feel · unable to exerci l:: an innuence on union decision rnaking con1n1ensurate\vith it~ perception of it~ sectional status and potential trength (Turner . . 1962. p ~65) . Typically uch rninorities are defined in tenn~ of occupation or ski]] and. alrnost hy definition. occur in large unions with a heterogeneou n1cn1bership.ln respect ofconglon1cratc occupational unions Lerner (1961. p 191) stres e~ the in1portance of occupational groups being ··able lo innuence decisions affecting their O\vn occupation ... This n1ay be diffi~ult to achieve in practice. because the in1petus to rnaintain established relativities rneans decisions relating to one group irnpact on n1os1 others. Whether a breakaway occurs. ho\vever. depends on a variety of factors. son1e of \Vhich are conditioned by the Australian systern of union regi tration . Usually a breakavt'ay \Vill be strongly opposed by ernployer and the relevant union. En1ployers recognise that brcaka\\'ays \\'i11 ahnost inevitably pursue in1proveu \\ages and conditions n1orc aggres · ively than establisheu unions. Recognition of a breakav.CI) \Vould a: lso provoke indu trial reta'liation frorn other unions and a deterioration ofnorn1aJ induslrial relation proce e ·. Furthennorc tht: nature and exlent of union ·ecurity devices \VOuld affect the capaci'ly of a breaka\vay to recruit n1ernhcrs and achieve a financially \'iable size. The po ition of a breaka\vay union is further con1plicated hy the registration proct:SS \\ hich enables a regist.ered union to oppose an applicant on. an1ong other things. the ground that .. an organisation to \Vhich the rnetnbers of lh~ association rnight conveniently belong has already been registcred . .. 4 Although the objectors · rnay uhiinatcly fail. their opposition can succeed indirectly by necessitat · ing a costly and prolonged series of legal proceeding · \Vhich fe\v ne\vly fonned organis,ttiuns '~roulcl have the resource~ to \Vithstand. l ·he institutional features discussed above are in1portant innuenccs on the conduct and character of Australian unions. The prorninence of arbitral procc~dings and the exten~i\e latutory regulation of union conduct tends to produce organisation~ \Vhich are highly centrali "ed. Dispute set fling and <1\\·ard rna king de\ olvc to\vard full-tin1c officials\\ ith . hop noor organisation typically re1naining undeveloped. There are notable exception like the An1aJgan1ated Metal Workers Union and the Building Worker Industrial l lnion ( Davis. 1977. pp 357-60: Davis. 19R3. pp 212-14) . · Generally a nun1bcr of unions \Viii have coverage rights in a particular industry and in respect of a particular group of\\'Orkcr .. these rights n1ay overlap. Two possibilities flov~' fron1 this: workers have a choice of union or the overlap is a source of inter-union conflict. ln the latter case. dual union n1en1bership is a solution son1etirnes adopted. Con11nonly . federal registration and union security arrangen1cnt. con1bine to deny workers a choice of union and 1nay in1ply n1cn1bership of a union in which their interest is a n1inority vie\\'. It is argued above. ho\vever1 that there is little scope for such a group to secede and forn1 a federally regi tered union . An alternative is to 1nerge \Vith an existing union as occurred in the Victorian po,ver indu "'try.
In lht: \ ' ictorian pO\ver industry there i a n1uhiplicity of unions although. for the rnost part. a \VOrker·s classification preclude " any choice of union . Po\vcr station operators arc the cxc, ept· ion \Vith 'the Au "'tralian In ·titute of Marine and Po\ver Engint!ers (A1~1PE). tht! Federated Engine Driver and Firernen·s Association (1-I: I)FA) and the ~1unicipal Officers 3
In 1974 the 2 unions concerned. the l·edcnHed Ship\\ right s and Ship Construl:tor~ A~,o~iation nnd the Amalgarnated rvtctal ~Vorkcrs l~nion. amalgarnalcd hut it is not dear whe1 ther thl· demarcation 1 i n e con t i n u e s w i 1 h i n l h c m l: rg e d u n i u n . The SECV po,~·er station operator~ arc stafflahour and as such have traditionally received superior conditions of en1ployn1ent to n1ost other SE(~V en1ployces. 1 n turn they are expected lo excn:i~c high levels of skill and r~sponsibility. being charged \Vith the safe operation. n1aintcnance and repair of the co1nplex and volat.ile equip1nent constituting a po\ver slation. Notwithstanding their special position. the operators have exhibited an orie-ntation to unioni~n1 and an industrial tnilitancy \vhich is surprising at first sight. l 'hcre is. hov~'ever. a gro~' ing literature directed to expla, ining th · is phenornenon 6 (for ẽxarnplc. Griffin. 1985) . The factors \Vh ich appear to be centra I to the present case are 'the strategic location and the relati\ e deterioration in the \Vages and condition of the operators.
The technological and social organisation ofpo\ver station has n1cant that operator . . are \\C1l placed for engaging in industrial ac'lion. \Vhile the irnposition of \VOrk ban ha~ in11nediatc and drastic con sequences. ~uch action i readil) r~ver iblc if contined to reduct.ions in generating load. Õver tin1e thi s leverage ha s been enhanced hy the increas· ing capacity of generating units. l J n t· il 1961. the largest generali ng set in the Latrobe Ya Uey \\'as 20 rnega,vatts hut the con1n1i sioning of 't' allourn l: in lhal year increased this figure to 120 n1ega\vatts . l~he con11nissioning of 1-Jazehvood Pov,,er Station het\\'een 1962 and 1969 brought 011 stn:anl R generating units of:!OO n1ega\Va'tts.l~his '\Vas rollo\ved by the COI1111l ' iS ioning ofthe )' allourn W pO\\'Cr station \v· ith ~ 350 n1cga\vau uni : ts and 2 375 111Cgl:nvatt units. Most recently. in 19R4. the first of4500 rnega,vatl uni'l~ V.'Cre con1n1issioned at the Loy )' ang pov.'erstation. A. po\ver stations becon1e larger and n1ore technologically advan~cd lhc electricity supply . yslenl is rendered n1ore vulnerable to industrial disruption. l .his vulnerahilily · is further increa~ed by the gradual centralLation of generating capacity in fhc Latrobe \ ' alley.
These technological factors are con1plen1ented by the kill specificit) oft he operator . For exan1ple. because Hazehvood po\ver slation \vas con1n1is ioned O\Cr a nun1bcr of years. the control roon1s ofthe 8 units differ sub tanlially and n1ost operators are qualified in relation to a particu ' lar unit Like\vise. operators cannot shift frorn one po\~' er station to another \\'ithout further training. Typica11y. hO\\'evcr.operators retnain SECYen1ployecs fora n1ajorportion of their ~'orking Jives. being trained and retrained for successively higher positions or other positions at a sirnilar level. l'he IO\V subslitutability or skills specificity of lhe operators 5 l-or a n1or~ detailed discu sion or the' .triou. unions in\oh~d in the po\\er inJustry see an earlier paper h) the author (TeiLhcr. .
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The notion of a \erie' of ahernatJ\c form~ of exprcs"ing indu"trial (Onllicl i" l.'O n1n1on in the ... od(,logil'alliten:aturl· on inuu~trial relation": ""c for exarnplc: R l-l}llHin ( llJ72 p 57 4.50 . that is. fn.)nl 9.R to 11.4 percent of an Assistant LJnit ( 'ontrollcr's n1inirnun1 \\age ratc.s The resultant relativit) con1prcssion has gencrall) been 111aintained through sub~equcnt adjustn1ents to SIPS because the operators art.! covered hy a p a i d ra 1 c!) a n d not a 111 in i 111 u 111 ra t c s a\\ a rd. S t i II f u rt her d c t e rio ra lion i n the re 1 a t i' e po i ti on of 1 lhe operators occurred foliO\\ ing the C'onl Jll'ission ·s departure fronl run \\'age indexation in it~ National \Vag~ ( 'as\! decisions b~ginning \\' .ith the Man.:h quarter 1976 and ending \\ith the l)t.:ccnl her quarter 1977. Flat ra tc i ncrea scs \•lh ic h '~v~re in tcg ra I to pI a tea u i ndcxa lion b rough t u 2.4 pcrcenl increase in th~ fitter\ rci<Hivity to 56.3 percent in a period ,,.,hich corresponds \Vilh the shift,,.·ork dispute of 1976-77.
The pressure placed on the operator·. r~lali\'e po~ition b) n1ctal industl)' \\'age n1ovc1nents. incr~ased over a\a.rard pa) n1cnts. and National \Vag, c Ca c decis· ions. \Va~ exacerbated by actual and i1npending che1ngcs in en1plo) n1enl conditions. Di · ... ati ·faction \Vi'th continuing differential bct\\Cen staff and \\'ages en1plo)ccs \Vas r~n~ctcd in a logofclairn .. prepared hy Latrobe Valle) shop ste\vards in Janual") 1977. Along \vith increa ed \vagcs. the) denu1ndcd that condition ofen1ployn1ent of,,agc~ cn1ployees be increased lo achieve parit) ~'ith ' taff crnplo)~C~ (Ben on and Goff. 1979. p 211 ) . Later that year the failure of negotiations resulted in a prolonged strike h) tnaintenance \\'Orkers. Although the stoppag, e brought only n1inor i1nprovcrnenl!\ in wages it "et in train a proce s entailing further erosion of the relative position of operators and other staff. Arguably. the n1aintenance \VOrkers strike '~'as the prin1ary ~onsideration underlying \Vhat has been descr· ibcd as the ·~sEc,·v·s desire to tnove lO\\' a nJs u n i forn1 ity of non \vages conditions .. ( l)evries. 19S3~ p 270). : During 1 97X there \Vas an in1proven1cnt in sick leave entitlen1ent~ and an upgrading of the (Wages) En1ployee Retircn,ent and Benefit Fund ''as under consideration. Subscqu~ntly there have been in1pro\en1ents in the Retiretnent Fund and sick lca\'e as \vell as reductions in hour .. of\\'Ork.
The differential conditions ofSEC'\ 1 sta(fand \vages en1ployees are evidenced by the fal:t that lhe Rctiren1ent Fund \Vas note tab11shed until 1970 and hitherto \Vages cn1ployees r~ceived a gratuity based on year~ of service. Since 1977 benefits p"tyablc fron1 the Retiren1ent Fund have been in1provcd ' in rclati\'e tcnns. ln respect of ick leave entitlcrnenls. there has been a progres i\e narro,ving of inequalities and after altenrtions in Man.:h 1980 the onl) difference bel\vecn the 2 groups ~'aS the cntitlcn1ent on engagcn1ent 12 shifts for tafT and 5 'or \vagt:s en1ployees. Follo\ving the 19RO shift,vork dispute that gap ~urthcr tlirninished \Vith ~ages crnployees rec, eiving 8 shift on engagen1ent. l)· ifferential hours of \VOrk are also a consideration and until 1981 \1\ag· es ernployces '~'orkcd a 40 hour 'Neck and staff'. a 3X.5 hour \\'Cck. Thi~ difference \vas one that lhc n1aintenance \Vorkers sought to abolish in ' 1977~ and by early 1980 it had becorne a principal concern oflh~ An1algan1ated Metal \~' orkers Un · ion and other unions repre ~enting ''ages en1ployee . The conduct oft hi~ can1paignneatly O\ erlap the 19{ 0 hift\\Ork dispute. \\ith Latrobe Valley ~hop sh~\\'ards receiving reports fr0111 officials of the Australian Council ofTrade Union and the Victorian Trade~ Hall ( ' ouncil on 2~ April and deciding to conduct a separate shorter hour~ can1paign fron1 that in Australian industt; general)} . Detailed negotiations \Vith the SEC' V con1n1enccd in August and resulted in the introduction of a 37.5 hour \\'eek/9 day fortnight for all SEC~\, ernployce~ in Janual) 19Sl. Significant)). as the 1980 shiftv.·ork dispute developed. SEc·v \\ages en1plo)ees \\ere turning their attention to a reduced hours carnpaign \\'h ich. given the SECV's predilection for uniforn1 en1ployn1ent conditions. \Vould l~ave the operators relativ~ly \VOrse off.
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A detailed tahk 'ho\\ ing .til wage" nd rei a th it~ mo\'~n1en ts over a I 0 Y'-'" r period to llJXO b a' ai ldhle on application to the author. X SIPS is a flat rate O\er uward payn1cnt gcdreLito )edr~ ol ~'-· rvu:e. It "a' introduced to enable the V•~tori,nl publi~ 'e~· tor to L·ornpL·te \\ith priYalc en1plo~cr!-\ in attracting and retaining ~uitabl~
In e sence then~ the operator \Vere in an exceUent strategic position and the unarrested deterioration in lheir pay and condit· ions relativity \Vith wages en1ployees provided a trong incentive for exerting industrial pre sure. Before they could act effectively the operators needed an effective voice \Vi thin the MOA or a separate organisational vehicle \\'ith \\'hich to participate in the federal industrial relations systern. ' The MÕA rnade cu ns idcrahk gains for 'their me1nh~rs in the late 1960s and early ll.J70s a nd the indus tria I n1u scle of the ta ff sh i ftworkcr ''as u~etl to bel p rna ke the~e gain~. however a lo t of th e e gain s ditl not go to lhc shift\\ o rkcrs 0 -)011 . 19R3. p 3).
In 1976. following pressure by the operators. the MOA. served clain1s on the SECY seeking in1proved shift work cond: itions. 1"he n1ajor clain1s v.rere: increased shift pren1iun1 . v.'eek-end and ovcrtin1e penalties~ inclusion of all allO\\'ances and penalties in overtin1e calculations: increa sed annual leave and optional early retircn1enl \Vith full benefit for shift\ovorkers. The cl:.tin1 s \Vere r~je c lcd \Vith 2 n1inor exception . Cornhin~d n1cctings of AIMPE. FEOl---A and MOA responded to thi s \Vith an ullirnatu1n that if a ··satisfactory ans\Vt:r is not rccc· ivcd by 7/ 1/ 77 a further tne·ting \Vill be convened to consider direct action·· (MOA. l976).l'hc SEC."V di scounted tht: threat as ucxccutivc generated \Vith the support of a fc\V rnilitants .. ( E(~V. 1976) . In January 1977 . the operators n1et again and decided to hold a 24 hour strike follov.rcd by \VOrk han s. On it s 0'\\'11 JllOtion the c·oncilialion and Arbitation Con1n1ission altt rnptt:d to I 55 "'Cltlc the dispute b) putting forv.ard a 3 point proposal: a pri\ ate arbitration. the partie~ v,ai'c their rights to forn1al proceedings including appc'ah and deferral of intlustrial action. Industrial action seen1cd inevitable fo1lov;ing the SE('V r~jcc'lion ofthb prupo~al. Ho\\'C"\cr. \\hen lhc MOA Latrobe VaHc) ~hift\vorkcrs n1et in February 1977 they \Otcd to .. defer·· the stoppage but hrough t fot\va rd the i n1 posil ion of han~ { M OA. 1977 a) . A It hough the deferral nHl) ha\c been based on tactical consideration!' at least "on1c of the operator~ perceived it a!" a betrayal by the MOA (Lyon. 19X3. p 3) . l·hc in1n1int:ncc of hans led the Arbitration C'on1n1i~ ion to convt:ne a pri\ ate confercn~~ to consider a revised ~cttlcn1cnt propo. al. Again ~10A a~tcd indcci~ively t~nd \\OUld ha\'c accepted the diluted scttlcn1ent propo~n1. but the Sl·( V rcn1aincJ intransigent st:cking urhitration of all clain1~.1 hi obduracy highlighted the indl·ci"ti\'cncs~ of the MOA lcadcr~hip and acted as a catal)~t forlhc secession of the n1ilitant operator~. J-ollov. ing. the failed senlctncnt proposaL a n1ceting of t\10A hift"·orkcr 'otcd to .. r~l proposition and in eiTccl did \\hat fc" other union~ h<n~ done-granted op~rat ' ional au tonon1y to a group of n1e1n hers. For the n1o t part Australian unions altern pt to li rnit hranch autonon1y \vhereas the AIMPE Sub-branch \Vas given such latitude that it could en1bark on industrial action \Vithout approval fron1 the State or Federal levels of 'the union. The concession ofSub-hranch autonorny n1ay have been a pragn1atic atten1pt to offset a dwindling in rnen1ber~hip and revenue occasioned by the clecl· ine of 'the Austra' lian n1aritin1e industry (Melbourne Sun. 1980 . . p 46).1n any case this 1node of operation was not unfamiliar to AJMPE \Vith its far flung rnen1bership at sea being left to run their O\Vn affairs for long periods oftin1e. l~he refonncd AIMPE Sub-brnnch tnoved quickly to recrui! Latrobe Valley operators by tapping discontent atnong M· OA n1en1her ... It en1phasi ed that in representing a restricted range of classHical'ion the interest of one group \VOuld not be sacrificed to .. the veto of large groups of n1en1bers in other po ition . i.e. trade offs. back clo\vns and other con1pron1ises be· ing n1ade so as to protect the interests of persons not connected \\ith shift operations·· (AIMPE. 1977a ). This \vas an unsubtle reference to MOA convened n1eetings ofshift\.vorkers \vhere lhe operators \Vere outvoted by day\\'Orker staff.
Meetings of pov.rer induslry union continued during 1979 but . . lack of support for a national can1paign resulted in a decision to restricl action to Victoria.' By the end of the year MOA \Vas in a sin1ilar position to 1976: it vlas about to serve a :tog of clairns on behalf of shift\vorkers but this \Vas to b~ a joint unions ca1npaign focusing on AIMPE. FEDFA and MOA. This tin1e around there \vas one fundan1en1al difference: AIMPE had recruited slrongly an1ong the disaffected operator and the breakav.tay union represented the n1ajority of unit controllers. as istant unit controllers and charge engineers at the unitised po\ver stations. The ece sion and fonnation of the AlMPE Sub-branch tneant the operators'vie"'S had to be explicitly accounted for. Hence. AIMPE initially rnade . its participation conditional on i ncl us ion of a cla i 111 for earning .. -related shift pretn i u 111 . . . not just an · increase in the existing nat rate sh'ift pren1iun1s. Subsequently AIMPE revised it position to include a nat rate cornponent but the MOA rejected th · i as it did nol contain a n1inin1un1 paytnent to protect the earnings of lower classifications {AIMPE. 1979) .
In early 1980 AI MPE \Vas the only union keen to procet:cl \Vi th ash i ft\\'Ork log of clai:n1s: the FED FA and MOA \lvere preoccupied \Vith other industrial issues. The consequences of the resurreLtion of the Al"tvtPE Sub-branch no\v hecatne eviclent. l'he Sub-branch \Vas pressing the Victorian Branch officials to serve the clain1s and un'ilateral'lv undertake an industrial · -can1paig:n. AIMPE responded and served the log on 2 ApriL on'ly to be follo\ved by MOA 2 \Veeks later. Having pre-en1pted the other unions AlMPE indicated to F'EDFA and MOA that · it till favoured a joint carnpaign. In any case the clain1s ' -J erved on the SECV \Vere aln1ost identical to the joint union , log fonnulatecl in 1979. As in 1977 the SECV rejected the clain1s relying upon · its confonnity \Vith national standard and the force of the Arbitration Con11ni · ion dec· is· ion in the 1976-77 hiflv.rork di pute (ACAC. 1977) . MOA n1et the rejection by proposing industrial action for late in May and the convening of a con1bined unions n1eeting to endorse that action ( AIMPE. 1980) . The AIM PE Sub-branch Executive rejected a con1bined unions n1eeting. referring to the operators· experience of being outvoted in the 1977 dispute. Instead AIMPE again pre-etnpted M· OA by calling a n1eeting \Vhich \vould precede the MOA n1eeting and proposing industrial action at 1-lazelwood and Yallourn W. the 2 station --\vhere the n1ajority of operators \V~re i\IMPE n1en1bers (AJMPE. PJ80).
In vie\v of the threatened industrial action the SECV notified the Arbitration Con1n1i . . _sion of an industrial dispute but proceedings \verc adjourned on the basi of an MOA subn1ission that it \Van ted to place ne\ .. , :n1ateriaJ before tht: SEC\ 1 . The AIMPE Sub-branch re ponded by forestalling indu trial ac'lion pending lhe outcon1e of di ' "cussions \Vith the SEC'V. These discussions \Vere abortive and industrial aLtion \Vas inevitable unless AIMPE resiled fron1 its threats as had the MOA in 1977. The breaka\vay union \Vas in a different situation. ho,vevt:r: the occupational hon1ogeneity of its tnernbers and the perceived in1portance of the shiftwork c' lain1s nrilitated againsl a retreat. l·he AIMPE Sub-branch n1ct and decided on a (purportedly) indefinite~ hutdo\vn of 1-Iazelv~'ood and )' allourn W f'O\Vcr lations beginning ~3 June. A 5 day lead tin1e \Vas provided for M· OA to tneet and consider partici· pation in the industria ' l action (AIMPE. 1980) . Thu ''. despite its dt=sirt: ror a joint carnpaign. the AIMPE Sub-branch continued to force the pact' or events in an Hpparcnt atten1pt to fuHil'l the expectations of its tnen1ber'".
On the eve oft he stoppage there \vere further clicussions \vilh the SECV and a hearing in 
